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Abstract
We examine the buyer-seller problem under diﬀerent levels of commitment. The seller is
informed of the quality of the good, which aﬀects both his cost and the buyer’s valuation, but
the buyer is not. We characterize the allocations that can be achieved through mechanisms
in which, unlike with full commitment, the buyer has the option to “walk away” after
observing a given oﬀer. We further characterize the equilibrium payoﬀs that can be achieved
in the bargaining game in which the seller makes all the oﬀers, as the discount factor goes
to one. This allows us to identify how diﬀerent levels of commitment aﬀect outcomes, and
which constraints, if any, preclude eﬃciency.
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1 Introduction
Mechanism design and non-cooperative bargaining theory have until recently evolved quite
independently. The former gives us a powerful tool and a compact language for describing what
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1outcomes can be implemented. But the agents’ commitment that it typically assumes makes
it unsuitable for the study of many actual institutions. Bargaining theory, on the other hand,
starts with a precise description of the rules that direct the negotiations. Unfortunately, this also
means that it becomes diﬃcult to disentangle what in the environment is driving the diﬀerent
properties of the equilibrium.
In this paper, we consider the standard buyer-seller trading problem with an informed seller
and interdependent values, and provide a characterization of implementable allocations and
achievable payoﬀs under diﬀerent degrees of commitment. In doing so, we break down the
role played by commitment, from the full-commitment mechanism to the bargaining game with
vanishing frictions.
Our setting is that of the lemon problem, as introduced by Akerlof (1970). Values are in-
terdependent, and the seller knows both the value and cost of the unit, while the buyer does
not.1 There is common knowledge of gains from trade. The (full commitment) problem has been
throughly investigated by Samuelson (1984) and Myerson (1985), and their ﬁndings provide the
starting point for our analysis. As already pointed out by Myerson (1981), optimal mechanisms
with interdependent values can exhibit strange properties. In particular, in our problem, the
optimal mechanism need not satisfy posterior individual rationality. That is, the buyer may
lose from participating in the mechanism given the information that this mechanism conveys:
if the buyer were to reconsider his willingness-to-trade in light of the oﬀer that he is supposed
to accept, given that this oﬀer leads him to re-evaluate his expected value for the unit, he may
very well prefer to pass. Allowing him to do so is a feature of most real-world institutions, as
Gresik (1991a) has pointed out: buyers can rarely be coerced into accepting oﬀers that make
them worse oﬀ. And this is certainly the case if the buyer and seller are engaged in bargaining.
1By a simple change of variable, all our results apply to the case in which it is the buyer who is informed and
who makes oﬀers, and the seller is uninformed.
2Therefore, we turn our attention to the optimal mechanism when the buyer cannot be forced
to buy. This property, which we call veto-incentive compatibility, following Forges (1999), imposes
restrictions on the mapping from reported types to the distribution over oﬀers that the mechanism
speciﬁes. Veto-incentive compatibility, then, is a restriction on the graph of this map: conditional
on any given oﬀer, the posterior belief of the buyer should be such that he is willing to accept
this oﬀer. Note that we are not imposing ex post individual rationality, a stronger requirement
that posits that the buyer gains given the actual state of nature (i.e., his true valuation). The
diﬀerence matters here, since values are interdependent (see Gresik, 1991b, Forges, 1994, and
Matthews and Postlewaite, 1989). Note also that we are not relaxing commitment on the seller’s
side. We choose not to do so both because it appears slightly less problematic from a practical
point of view, but also because, as we shall see in Section 5.3, commitment by the seller bears
little role in our main results.
As one immediately suspects, restricting attention to deterministic oﬀers would entail a loss of
generality. Nevertheless, we show that, if there are ﬁnitely many types (an assumption our model
does not impose), it is enough to consider as many oﬀers as types. Moreover, we may assume
that the k-th highest oﬀer only comes from the seller’s k-th highest type and above. This result
is somewhat reminiscent of Bester and Strausz (2001), although our environment does not ﬁt
their model.2 More importantly, we show that whether a given allocation can be implemented in
a veto-incentive compatible way or not is a property of (the map from reports to) the probability
of trade and expected price alone. Unlike the mechanism itself, which is a joint distribution
over the reported types and oﬀers, these are simply functions of reported types. Therefore, the
problem reduces then to a standard optimal control problem, to which variational techniques
can be applied. The interesting feature is the property imposed by veto-incentive compatibility:
2There are some technical diﬀerences (notably, a continuum of types vs. ﬁnitely many types), but most
importantly, we are not in their single-agent environment.
3the necessary and suﬃcient condition is that the buyer’s ex ante payoﬀ, conditional on trading
with all types above a given threshold be nonnegative, for all possible values of this threshold.
We then relax commitment even further, and turn to the inﬁnite-horizon bargaining game in
which the seller makes all the oﬀers. Clearly, the resulting outcome must satisfy veto-incentive
compatibility, since the buyer can reject any given oﬀer. Clearly also, the temporal monopoly of
the seller provides him with a lower bound on his payoﬀ, a security payoﬀ, that he can guarantee
no matter how patient players are. More precisely, the seller can always secure a price equal to
the buyer’s lowest possible valuation. Sequential rationality imposes further constraints, since
for instance, both the seller’s, and the buyer’s payoﬀs must be individually rational, not only
from the ex ante point of view, but from any history onward. Yet we prove that this ex ante
lower bound on the seller’s payoﬀ, along with veto-incentive compatibility, is the only further
constraint imposed by bargaining: every payoﬀ vector that can be achieved by a veto-incentive
compatible allocation and that gives the seller this security payoﬀ is an equilibrium payoﬀ vector
if the two players are patient enough. This might sound like a folk theorem, but this only holds
in terms of payoﬀs: there are allocations that are veto-incentive compatible, and give the seller
his security payoﬀ, and yet cannot be implemented in the bargaining game.
Our contribution, therefore, is threefold:
• Methodological: we develop tools to deal with constraints imposed by a lack of commitment,
and show how to reduce a multidimensional variational problem to a pair of one-dimensional
ones. We believe that these tools might be useful for more general environments with private
information and limited commitment.
• Conceptual: we clarify what it is about equilibrium in the bargaining game that restricts
the set of attainable payoﬀs: non-commitment on one hand, as captured by veto-incentive
4compatibility, and individual rationality on the other, as captured by the lowest type’s
reservation payoﬀ. We derive a type of “folk theorem” subject to those restrictions, though
this folk theorem is in terms of ex ante payoﬀs. As we show through an example, this
folk theorem does not extend to interim payoﬀs, and might fail to include the equilibrium
payoﬀ in the equilibrium in the game in which the buyer makes all the oﬀers (Deneckere
and Liang, 2006).
• With respect to the bargaining literature, our paper, alongside with Deneckere and Liang’s,
provides an understanding of the role of who makes the oﬀers. For instance, the most
eﬃcient equilibrium outcome when the seller makes all the oﬀers is strictly more eﬃcient
than the equilibrium outcome when the buyer makes the oﬀers. Sometimes, even the
most ineﬃcient equilibrium does better. We provide suﬃcient conditions for bargaining
to achieve constrained eﬃciency. In those circumstances, our result implies that as little
commitment as bargaining suﬃces. Conversely, if bargaining fails to achieve eﬃciency,
then trading institutions will only be successful in promoting eﬃciency if they manage to
weaken the veto-incentive compatibility constraint, as is the case, for instance, when the
uninformed party is asked to commit to a screening contract.
Among related papers, Ausubel and Deneckere (1989) analyze the link between mechanism
design and and bargaining in the special case of private values (with one-sided incomplete in-
formation). They show that, when the uninformed party makes all the oﬀers, a folk theorem
holds. That is, every incentive compatible, individually rational, direct bargaining mechanism
is implementable by sequential equilibria, if the frequency of oﬀers is high enough. On the
other hand, if the informed party makes the oﬀer, a unique equilibrium outcome gets singled
out as the frequency of oﬀers increases. Our paper establishes that, as one would suspect, lack
of commitment imposes more constraints with interdependent values than with private values.
5Interestingly though, the set of equilibrium payoﬀs that can be achieved remains fairly easy to
characterize, as the feasible set of some programming problem. The paper by Deneckere and
Liang that was already mentioned provides a careful analysis of the bargaining game in which
the (uninformed) buyer makes all the oﬀers, and they prove that the equilibrium outcome is then
unique. We comment further on the relationship with Deneckere and Liang, as well as with other
papers, as we proceed.
Section 2 develops the set-up. The main results are stated in Section 3, and their proofs are
provided in Section 4, with auxiliary results relegated to appendices. In Section 5, we discuss
extensions. In particular, we analyze veto-incentive compatibility on the seller’s side, and argue
that it is less stringent a requirement than on the buyer’s side. In particular, adding veto-
incentive compatibility for the seller does not aﬀect the set of achievable payoﬀs, whether one
insists on veto-incentive compatibility for the buyer or not.
2 The Set-Up
2.1 The Trading Problem
Consider a trading problem in which player 1, the seller, owns an indivisible object that
player 2, the buyer, wants to purchase. The players’ valuations are determined by the realization
of a random variable that is uniformly distributed over the unit interval, t ∼ U[0,1]. That
is, given t, the seller’s cost and the buyer’s value for the object are given by c(t) and v(t)
respectively. The functions c : [0,1] → R+ and v : [0,1] → R+ are assumed to be non-decreasing,
piecewise continuous and right-continuous (and hence, a.e. diﬀerentiable). For convenience, in
the statements of all results, we further make the assumption that c is piecewise diﬀerentiable
on (0,1). Because v need not be a constant function, this environment displays interdependent
6values, of which private values is a special case. Observe that the assumption that t is uniformly
distributed is made with no loss of generality, given the restrictions imposed on the functions v
and c. In Section 5, we extend some of the results to the case in which c and v are not both
monotonic.
Information is asymmetric. The seller is informed of the realization of the random variable,
and knows therefore both his cost and the buyer’s value for the object. We refer to this realization
as the seller’s type t ∈ T := [0,1]. The buyer, on the other hand, does not observe this realization.
However, he knows the distribution of the random variable, and the functions v and c are common
knowledge.




v(t) − c(t) > 0.
Such a “gap” rules out the special case in which v(0) = c(0) = 0, as in Akerlof (1970), but it
does not imply that the ﬁrst-best allocation (which requires trade to take place with probability
one) is attainable if individual rationality is imposed. Such a ﬁrst-best mechanism is individually
rational if and only if the buyer’s expected value exceeds the seller’s highest cost (see Lemma 1 of
Deneckere and Liang, 2006). While our results can be adapted to this case, the trading problem
becomes then rather uninteresting, and we rule it out in the sequel.
Our purpose is to characterize the allocations that can be achieved when there is limited
commitment. More precisely, we wish to compare the set of allocations that are achievable
under full commitment with those that can be obtained under weaker forms of commitment.
First, we shall consider the case in which the buyer cannot be forced to trade if the actual oﬀer
that is being made leads to a negative expected payoﬀ. Following Forges (1999), we refer to
this assumption as veto-incentive compatibility. Given the mechanism, and for any outstanding
7oﬀer, the buyer updates his expected value for the object. Veto-incentive compatibility requires
this conditional expectation to exceed the oﬀer, whenever the mechanism speciﬁes trade in this
event. This captures the notion that, in most trading environments, buyers can always reject
an oﬀer for which they anticipate a loss. In the words of Gresik (1991a), “in most markets each
trader has the ability to refuse to trade when the “best” negotiated terms give him negative
utility.” For instance, a seller who puts up an object for sale in an auction house commits to
the eventual outcome, given the auction mechanism, but potential buyers can drop out at any
stage of the auction process. Note that, with interdependent values, this does not ensure that
the buyer will not experience regret, that is, that his realized value will exceed the price that he
paid. In many markets, there is not much a buyer can do to renege on a purchase for which his
experienced utility falls short of the price that he paid. In this sense, the trade need not be ex
post individually rational. (Note that the two notions coincide in the case of private values.) At
the time of purchase, however, the potential buyer cannot be forced to accept an outstanding
oﬀer, if he anticipates a loss, simply because he chose to participate in the trading process.
The set of payoﬀs that can be achieved under these two mechanisms will then be compared
to the set of payoﬀs in the inﬁnite-horizon bargaining game with discounting, in which the seller
makes all the oﬀers.
2.2 Mechanisms
Direct mechanisms, that require the seller to report his type, provide a way for setting the
terms of trade. To be more formal, a direct mechanism is a probability transition from T to
{0,1} × R+.3,4 A direct mechanism, then, speciﬁes whether trade occurs (the outcome “1” is
3That is, for each t ∈ T, µ(t) is a probability distribution on {0,1}×R+, and the probability µ( )[A] assigned
to any Borel set A ⊂ {0,1} × R+ is a measurable function of t ∈ T.
4It is not hard to see that the restriction to oﬀers in R+ rather than R is without loss of generality in this
environment.
8interpreted as trade, while the outcome “0” means no trade), and at what price, according
to some joint distribution, and given the announcement of the seller. We let x(t) denote the
probability of trade, given the announcement t. That is,
x(t) := µ(t)[1,R+]. (1)
Without loss of generality, we assume that no payment is made if no trade occurs, that is, we






and set p(t) := 0 otherwise. Given x : T → [0,1] and p : T → R+, the allocation (x,p)
is implementable if there exists a mechanism µ (which implements (x,p)) such that x and p
coincide everywhere with the functions that are deﬁned by (1) and (2).
It follows from the revelation principle that attention can be restricted to direct mechanisms
in which the seller announces his type truthfully. Furthermore, under commitment, attention can
be restricted to mechanisms in which prices are deterministic, i.e. p(t) is the only price assigned
positive probability by µ(t)[1, ], for all t.
Given some direct mechanism µ, the payoﬀ to the seller of type t that reports s is given by
π
S(s|t) := x(s)[p(s) − c(t)].
The mechanism µ is incentive compatible if, for all s,t ∈ T, πS(t) := πS(t|t) ≥ πS(s|t). We shall
also be interested in the ex ante payoﬀ of the seller before his type is determined, that is, given










x(t)[p(t) − c(t)]dt. (3)
Fix some incentive compatible mechanism µ. Suppose that the buyer is oﬀered to trade at
some price p in the support of µ(t)[1, ] for some t ∈ T. What is his expected payoﬀ, conditional
on this outcome (1,p)? Given the mechanism µ, ﬁx a version of the conditional distribution
ν : ({0,1}×R+)×B → [0,1], where B is the Borel ﬁeld on T. Given T ∈ B, we write ν(T |p) for
ν((1,p),T ) , the conditional probability assigned to the seller’s type being in the set T , given the
event (1,p) (with an abuse of notation, we also write ν(t|p) for ν({t}|p)). The buyer’s expected











x(t)[v(t) − p(t)]dt. (4)
An incentive compatible mechanism µ is individually rational if πS(t) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ T, and
πB ≥ 0. Further, it is veto-incentive compatible if πB(p) ≥ 0 for all prices in the support of
µ. Because the buyer must break even given his conditional expectation, there is a priori no
reason to expect that it is suﬃcient to consider mechanisms that specify deterministic prices,
when considering veto-incentive compatible mechanisms.
To summarize, we shall be interested in determining the allocations (x,p) that can be imple-
mented by incentive compatible, individually rational and veto-incentive compatible mechanisms,
and in the set of ex ante payoﬀs π = (πB,πS) spanned by such allocations.5 For short, we refer
5A set of allocations {(x,p)} spans the payoﬀ set A ⊂ R2 if the image of that set, by the mappings deﬁned by
10to this problem as the veto-incentive compatible program, and these allocations as the veto-
incentive compatible allocations, to be compared with the full commitment allocations, in which
the requirement of veto-incentive compatibility is dropped. The problem of determining the
latter set is well-known (see, in particular, Samuelson, 1984, and Myerson, 1985), and is referred
to in the sequel as the full commitment program.
Of particular interest is the (constrained) eﬃcient allocation for each program, that is, any
allocation (x,p) that maximizes the overall gains from trade
 
T x(t)[v(t)−c(t)]dt, or equivalently,
that maximizes the sum of ex ante payoﬀs πS + πB.
2.3 The Bargaining Game
In the next, we drop the assumption of commitment on both sides, and consider the inﬁnite-
horizon bargaining game. Trivially, this further reduces the set of implementable allocations.
Deneckere and Liang (2006) have provided a comprehensive analysis of the game in which the
uninformed party, the buyer, makes all the oﬀers. Doing so allows to abstract from signaling
issues, since after any history there is only one action that the informed party can take that does
not terminate the game. Therefore, the analysis becomes tractable, although far from trivial,
and the equilibrium outcome turns out to be unique. We shall consider the opposite case, in
which the seller makes all the oﬀers, and show that, in this case as well, it is possible to provide
a simple characterization of the equilibrium payoﬀs as bargaining frictions vanish. Furthermore,
the best equilibrium improves upon the equilibrium in the game in which the buyer makes the
oﬀers (in terms of eﬃciency).
Let us deﬁne the bargaining game more formally. Time is discrete, and indexed by n =
1,...,∞. At each time or period n, the seller asks a price for the unit. After observing the price,
(3 ) and (4), is equal to A.
11the buyer either accepts or rejects the price. If the price is accepted, the game ends. If the oﬀer
is rejected, a period elapses and the seller asks for a price again. We shall allow for a public
randomization device in the initial period (for concreteness, think of a draw from the uniform
distribution on the unit interval), before the seller sets the ﬁrst price. This allows us to focus
on the extreme points of the equilibrium payoﬀ set, and we shall not refer to this randomization
device in the sequel.
The seller’s asking price can take any real value. An outcome of the game is a triple (t,n,pn),
with the interpretation that the realized type is t, and that the buyer accepts the seller’s price pn
in period n (which implies that all previous prices were rejected). The case n = ∞ corresponds
to the outcome in which the buyer rejects all the prices (as a convention, set p∞ equal to 0).
Buyer and seller discount future payoﬀs at the common discount factor δ ∈ (0,1). The seller’s
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function over outcomes is his net surplus δ
n−1(pn−c(t)) when
n < ∞, and zero otherwise. This suggests the interpretation of the cost as an actual production
cost incurred at the time of the transaction, but an alternative and equivalent formulation is that
the seller derives a ﬂow utility of (1 − δ)c(t) in every period in which he holds on to the unit.
The buyer’s realized utility is δ
n−1(v(t)−pn) when the outcome is (t,n,pn), n < ∞, and zero
if n = ∞.6 The players’ expected utilities over lotteries of outcomes, or payoﬀs, are deﬁned as
usual.
A history (of prices) hn−1 ∈ Hn−1 in case trade has not occurred by time n is a sequence
(p1,...,pn−1) of asking prices that the seller set and the buyer rejected (set H0 := ∅). A behavior
strategy σS for the seller is a sequence {σS
n}, where σS
n is a probability transition from T ×Hn−1
into R, mapping the seller’s type, the history hn−1 into a (possibly random) asking price. A
6Discounting plays no role in the optimality of the buyer’s strategy. Results would also apply to the case of a
sequence of short-run buyers, as long as we interpret the buyer’s payoﬀ as the discounted sum of these short-run
buyers’ payoﬀs.
12behavior strategy σB for the buyer is a sequence {σB
n}, where σB
n is a probability transition from
Hn−1 × R into {0,1}, mapping the history hn−1 and the outstanding price into a probability of
acceptance (as before, “1” denotes acceptance, and “0” rejection). We use the perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (PBE) concept as deﬁned in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, Deﬁnition 8.2).7 Given
some (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium, we follow standard terminology in calling a buyer’s oﬀer
serious if it is accepted by the seller with positive probability. An oﬀer is losing if it is not
serious. Clearly, the speciﬁcation of losing oﬀers in an equilibrium is, to a large extent, arbitrary.
Given some equilibrium σ = (σB,σS), we denote by πS(σ) and πB(σ) the ex ante payoﬀ of
the seller and the buyer, respectively. Note that this involves taking expectations with respect
to the seller’s type. Given δ, the payoﬀ vector π = (πB,πS) can be achieved in the bargaining
game if there exists an equilibrium σ of the bargaining game such that π = (πB(σ),πS(σ)).
Let E(δ) denote the set of equilibria in the bargaining game with discount factor δ, and
Π(δ) ⊂ R2 the set of payoﬀ vectors given discount factor δ. Further, deﬁne Π := liminfδ→1 Π(δ)
and Π := limsupδ→1 Π(δ) as the inner and outer limits of the equilibrium payoﬀ set as frictions
vanish. We shall show that those two sets are equal, and provide a simple characterization of
this set.
3 Main Results
3.1 Preliminaries: The Full Commitment Program
We start by recalling the characterizations obtained by Samuelson (1984) and Myerson (1985)
for the set of ex ante payoﬀs that can be achieved through mechanisms that satisfy incentive
7Fudenberg and Tirole deﬁne perfect Bayesian equilibria for ﬁnite games of incomplete information only. The
suitable generalization of their deﬁnition to inﬁnite games is straightforward and omitted.
13compatibility and individual rationality.
For later purposes, it is useful to deﬁne the following. Given a mechanism µ, deﬁne the
expected payment ¯ p(t) received by type t ∈ T as
¯ p(t) := x(t)p(t).
Note that specifying the function ¯ p : T → [0,1] is equivalent to specifying the function p, given
our convention that p(t) = 0 whenever x(t) = 0. Incentive compatibility is the requirement that
π
S(t) = ¯ p(t) − x(t)c(t) ≥ ¯ p(s) − x(s)c(t),






for all t ∈ T. We refer to this set of constraints as the set of local incentive compatibility
constraints.
Suppose that the local incentive compatibility constraints are binding for all t ∈ T.8 It is







In this case, all expected payments are uniquely determined by the probabilities of trade (and
8Because the cost function need not be continuous, there are allocations that are implementable in the full
commitment program for which some local incentive compatibility constraints are not binding.






t∈Dc x(t)(c(t) − lims↑t c(s)), where c′ is the
derivative of c on each interval, Dc is the set of discontinuities of c, and x is assumed to be right-continuous (since
c and v are, this is without loss of generality).
14the price ¯ p(1)) through









(x(s)v(s) − ¯ p(s))ds. (5)
Note that B(0) = πB. Further, if all local incentive compatibility constraints are binding, we can











[x(s)(v(s) − c(s)) −
  1
s
x(u)dc(u)]ds − (1 − t)(¯ p(1) − x(1)c(1)).
Trivially, given the revelation principle, the set of implementable allocations in the full commit-
ment program is characterized by incentive compatibility and individual rationality. A sharper
characterization can be obtained for the set of payoﬀ vectors that can be achieved. The following
theorem follows from the results of Samuelson (1984) and Myerson (1985).
Theorem 1 (Samuelson, 1984, Myerson, 1985) Suppose that c(1) ≥
 
T v(t)dt. In the full com-
mitment program:
1. The payoﬀ set can be obtained, without loss of generality, by assuming that all local incentive
compatibility constraints bind, and that the highest seller type’s payoﬀ is zero: πS(1) = 0;
152. The payoﬀ set is spanned by the set of non-increasing functions x : T → [0,1] subject to
  1
0




given expected payments, for all t ∈ T,




3. The payoﬀ set is a convex polygon whose extreme points are achieved by functions x : T →
[0,1] that are step functions with either two or three steps; the origin is an extreme point,
and for all other extreme points, it can be assumed that x(0) = 1.
Note that the constraint in the second part of the theorem is simply the requirement that
B(0) ≥ 0, given the deﬁnition of ¯ p. The requirement that x be non-increasing ensures incentive
compatibility, given the deﬁnition of ¯ p. Theorem 1.2. states that any non-increasing function x ∈
[0,1] satisfying B(0) ≥ 0 (a constraint that only involves the function x) is part of an allocation
that is implementable in the full commitment program, along with the expected payments deﬁned
in the theorem, and that these allocations are a suﬃcient class to generate all the payoﬀs that can
be achieved in this program. As mentioned, one mechanism implementing any such allocation
is a mechanism with deterministic prices. Of course, there are other mechanisms implementing
this allocation, and there are other allocations that are implementable, but they do not lead to
any additional payoﬀ vectors.
In light of this characterization, the payoﬀ set of the full commitment program can be obtained
by considering a family of continuous linear programs, in which one maximizes λ π over functions
x satisfying (2), where λ ∈ R2 are the (possibly negative) weights on the buyer and seller’s payoﬀs.
16The maxima of these programs determine the extreme points of the payoﬀ set, and it is then
a standard result that such extreme points are themselves achieved by extreme points of the
admissible set, i.e., by step functions.
The (constrained) eﬃcient allocation takes a very simple form, given that it is the solution of
a maximization problem in which both the objective and the single constraint are linear. Namely,
as Samuelson and Myerson show, the ex ante eﬃcient mechanism takes the following form: there
exist 0 < t1 < t2 ≤ 1 such that
x(t) =

    
    
1 t ∈ [0,t1),
x t ∈ [t1,t2],

































As can be veriﬁed, the threshold t1 (resp., t2) minimizes (resp., maximizes) the ratio
  t2




given t2 (resp., t1). The numerator measures the gains from trade with the types in the interval
[t1,t2], while the denominator measures the information rents of the seller’s types in that inter-
17val.10 Indeed, if the buyer were to trade with, and only with, the seller’s types [0,t], his expected




(v(s) − c(t))ds =
  t
0
(v(s) − c(s) − sc
′(s))ds, (7)
a function that plays an important role in Samuelson and Myerson’s analysis, as in ours.
3.2 The Veto-Incentive Compatible Program
Recall that the veto-incentive compatible program is obtained by adding to the full com-
mitment program the requirement that, for any outstanding oﬀer, the buyer’s payoﬀ is always
non-negative, conditional on the outstanding oﬀer, given his updated beliefs. At ﬁrst sight, these
constraints appear rather intractable, since these are restrictions on the marginal distributions
over types derived from the joint distribution over types and oﬀers that a mechanism deﬁnes.
The main result of this subsection establishes that, in fact, these constraints can be formulated
in terms of the probabilities of trade alone. Therefore, as in the full commitment problem, it is
enough to consider functions x, rather than distributions deﬁned by µ, to determine the payoﬀ
set, so that standard variational techniques can be applied.
We ﬁrst characterize implementable allocations, and then achievable payoﬀs. The following
proposition, proved in Section 4, characterizes the set of allocations that can be implemented
in the veto-incentive compatible program. Recall that, trivially, incentive compatibility and
individual rationality are minimal requirements.
Proposition 1 An incentive compatible, individually rational allocation (x,p) is implementable
10To see this, note that, from the formula for Y given by (7),
  t2
t1 sc′(s)ds is the diﬀerence between the gains
from trade and the buyer’s additional proﬁt accruing from the types [t1,t2).




x(s)[v(s) − p(s)]ds ≥ 0.
Equipped with Proposition 1, it is then straightforward to characterize the set of payoﬀs that
can be achieved in the veto-incentive compatible program.
Theorem 2 Suppose that c(1) ≥
 
T v(t)dt. In the veto-incentive compatible program:
1. The payoﬀ set can be obtained, without loss of generality, by assuming that all local incentive
compatibility constraints bind, and that the highest seller type’s payoﬀ is zero: πS(1) = 0;
2. The payoﬀ set is spanned by the set of non-increasing functions x : T → [0,1] subject to,
for all t ∈ T,
  1
t
[x(s)(v(s) − c(s)) −
  1
s
x(u)dc(u)]ds ≥ 0, (8)
given expected payments, for all t ∈ T,




Note that the constraint in the second part of the theorem is simply the requirement that B(t) ≥ 0
for all t ∈ T, given the deﬁnition of ¯ p. Theorem 2 .2. states that any non-increasing function
x ∈ [0,1] satisfying B(t) ≥ 0 for all t (a constraint that only involves the function x) is part
of an allocation that is implementable in the veto-incentive compatible program, along with the
expected payments deﬁned in the theorem, and that these allocations are a suﬃcient class to
generate all the payoﬀs that can be achieved in this program. Because of the veto-incentive
compatibility constraint, the mechanism that is constructed in the proof of this theorem is not,
19however, a mechanism with deterministic prices.
The constraints B(t) ≥ 0 (as stated in Theorem 2.2. in terms of the probabilities x(t) only)
are linear (in x) as well. It follows that the payoﬀ set can be once again determined by using
continuous linear programming. There is, however, one diﬃculty that is common to incentive
problems with hidden characteristics and a continuum of types, namely the requirement that the
function x be non-increasing. Fortunately, tools exist for such constraints. See, in particular,
Hellwig (2009). What is the structure of the solution for boundary points of the payoﬀ set?
It depends, of course, on the speciﬁc boundary point and the underlying functions c and v.
Nevertheless, for such a point, it is standard to show that the set of types can be divided into
a ﬁnite partition of intervals Tk such that, on each interval, either the probability x is constant,
or B is identically 0 (i.e. (8) is binding). Note that, by diﬀerentiating twice (8), we obtain that
the probability x must satisfy the ordinary diﬀerential equation
x
′(t)(v(t) − c(t)) + x(t)v
′(t) = 0
on any such interval. The problem then reduces to identifying this ﬁnite partition. Indeed,
examples can be constructed for which B is identically zero over some interval, and therefore,
the allocation need not be a step function, nor the payoﬀ set a convex polygon (the set of extreme
points need not be ﬁnite).
It is an easy consequence of this theorem that the payoﬀ vector maximizing the buyer’s payoﬀ
in the veto-incentive compatible program coincides with the payoﬀ vector that maximizes the
buyer’s payoﬀ in the full commitment program.11 The seller’s highest payoﬀ is either equal to,
or smaller than the corresponding payoﬀ in the full commitment program. Suﬃcient conditions
11In fact, this follows from Proposition 1 in Samuelson (1984), as he shows that the buyer’s favorite outcome
is a take-it-or-leave it oﬀer, so that veto-incentive compatibility does not bind at this allocation.
20for equality will be provided in the next section.
3.3 Bargaining Game
We ﬁnally consider the bargaining game. Clearly, for any history, given any outstanding
oﬀer that is accepted with positive probability, sequential rationality requires that the buyer’s
conditional payoﬀ from accepting it must be non-negative. Therefore, the ex ante payoﬀs that can
be achieved via bargaining must form a subset of the payoﬀ set of the veto-incentive compatible
program. But bargaining imposes additional constraints. For instance, since v is non-decreasing,
it is common knowledge that the object is worth at least v(0) to the buyer. Therefore, the
seller of type t can secure a payoﬀ of v(0) − c(t), since he can always insist on such an oﬀer.
(The formal argument is standard and omitted. See, for instance, Fudenberg, Levine and Tirole
(1985), Lemma 2, which establishes that no lower oﬀer is ever submitted in equilibrium, so that
any such oﬀer is necessarily accepted.) It is worth pointing out here that, if (x,p) is incentive
compatible, then πS(0) ≥ v(0) − c(0) implies that πS(t) ≥ v(0) − c(t) for all t ≥ 0, so that the
aforementioned requirement reduces to πS(0) ≥ v(0) − c(0). Since this provides a lower bound
on the seller’s payoﬀ, we may think of this as the seller’s reservation payoﬀ in the bargaining
game, a strengthening of individual rationality.
One might wonder whether bargaining imposes additional restrictions on achievable payoﬀs.
The main result of this subsection shows that this is not the case, as the discount factor tends
to one.
Before stating this result, note that, to every equilibrium σ, and for each seller’s type t, one
can associate a probability of trade x(t), namely the discounted total probability with which










where 1A is the indicator function of the event A. Similarly, given some equilibrium σ, we
let ¯ p(t) ∈ R denote the expected discounted payment received by type t in this equilibrium.
References to local incentive compatibility, or individual rationality, can be understood in terms
of the pair (x, ¯ p).
Theorem 3 Suppose that c(1) ≥
 
T v(t)dt. Then Π = Π =: Π. Further, this set of payoﬀ is
equal to the set of payoﬀs that can be achieved by veto-incentive compatible allocations for which
π
S(0) ≥ v(0) − c(0).
Which constraints bind depends on the vertex that is considered. On the upper boundary
of this set, it can be assumed, without loss of generality, that all local incentive compatibility
constraints are binding, and that the highest type’s payoﬀ of the seller trading with positive
probability is zero: πS(1) = 0; on the other hand, for those vertices that minimize some con-
vex combination of the seller’s and buyer’s payoﬀ, the incentive compatibility constraints bind






with the boundary condition that the trading price of the highest seller’s type t is given by the
minimum of v(t) and either lims↓t c(s), t < 1, or c(1) if t = 1.
Given that the bargaining game imposes only one additional linear constraint to the veto-
22incentive compatible program, it can be analyzed via linear programming as well. Depending
on c and v, this additional constraint can create a discontinuity (i.e., a step) in the function x
which has no counterpart in the previous (veto-incentive compatible) program, and arises before
the ﬁrst binding constraint B(t) = 0. Notice also that the constraint that πS(0) ≥ v(0) − c(0)
implies that the seller secures the ex ante payoﬀ E[(v(0)−c(t))+] (because, as already mentioned,
it implies that πS(t) ≥ v(0) − c(t) for all t). However, the two requirements are not equivalent,
as the example in the next subsection illustrates.
Theorem 3 is proved in the next section. In doing so, we shall show that the payoﬀ vector
maximizing the seller’s payoﬀ, which is also the eﬃcient payoﬀ vector in this set, coincides
with the payoﬀ vector maximizing the seller’s payoﬀ in the veto-incentive compatible program.
That is, as far as eﬃciency is concerned, bargaining imposes no constraint beyond veto-incentive
compatibility. In all three programs, the ex ante payoﬀ of the buyer must be zero in any eﬃcient
allocation.
The proof is by construction. This requires us to specify beliefs after out-of-equilibrium oﬀers.
While sequential equilibrium is not well-deﬁned in this game (the action space being inﬁnite),
our equilibrium can be made sequential by restricting this action set to a suﬃciently rich but
ﬁnite set of values. In this sense, our choice of oﬀ-path beliefs, while dictated by convenience,
is not particularly fragile. It would be of interest, of course, to examine how the use of more
restrictive concepts (such as perfect sequential equilibrium) would alter our results, but this is
beyond the scope of this paper.
As mentioned, this result establishes that the only additional constraint on payoﬀs imposed by
the bargaining game is that the lowest seller’s type must secure his reservation payoﬀ. However,
it is not true that any individually rational, incentive compatible allocation satisfying veto-
incentive compatibility, and giving the lowest seller’s type his reservation payoﬀ can be necessarily
23implemented in the bargaining game. In Section 5.2, we provide an example of such an allocation,
and explain why it cannot be implemented. For any such allocation, our result implies that there
exists a payoﬀ-equivalent allocation (in terms of ex ante payoﬀs for the seller and the buyer) that
can be implemented. Therefore, bargaining imposes restrictions on implementable allocations
that go beyond veto-incentive compatibility (and the restriction imposed by the security payoﬀ),
but not on payoﬀs.
3.4 Examples and Economic Implications
To illustrate the results, we consider here an example with three equiprobable types.
Example 4 The functions v and c are step functions with three steps, and the two discontinuities
occur for both functions at t = 1/3 and 2/3. To simplify, we refer to those three types as 1, 2,
and 3. Values and costs are given by
(c1,c2,c3) = (0,4,9), and (v1,v2,v3) = (2,5,12),
so that a higher index means a higher value, but also a higher cost. The left panel of Figure 1
represents the three payoﬀ sets. The largest area is the set of payoﬀs in the full commitment case,
while the smaller area is the payoﬀ set for the veto-incentive compatible program. The smallest
payoﬀ set is the equilibrium payoﬀ set in the bargaining game as δ → 1. By changing only one
parameter, namely, by increasing v2 from 5 to 10, the payoﬀ sets change considerably. See right
panel. The two points (440/1323,20/63) on the left, and (56/243,2/9) on the right, represent the
unique equilibrium payoﬀ vectors in the bargaining game in which the (uninformed) buyer makes
















































Figure 1: Full commitment, Veto-Incentive Compatible, and Limiting Equilibrium Payoﬀ Sets.
This example illustrates several points that hold more generally. First, as mentioned, the
buyer’s highest payoﬀ coincides in the veto-incentive compatible and the full commitment pro-
grams, but clearly, it might be lower in the equilibrium of the bargaining game. More importantly,
the seller’s highest payoﬀ coincides in the bargaining game and the veto-incentive compatible
program. This highest payoﬀ, however, might fall short of the highest payoﬀ in the commitment
program.12
When is (constrained) eﬃciency possible under bargaining, i.e., when is veto-incentive com-
patibility consistent with eﬃciency? Obviously, this is trivially the case if the optimal allocation
12Note also that, as is clear from the left panel, the restriction on achievable payoﬀs imposed by the lowest
seller’s type reservation payoﬀ is not equivalent to the restriction that the seller obtains the ex ante payoﬀ
E[(v(0)−c(t))+] = 2/3. Consider the vertex that minimizes the seller’s payoﬀ, subject to the buyer’s payoﬀ being
zero. The requirement that the seller’s lowest type gets at least v(0) − c(0) drives the seller’s ex ante payoﬀ up
to 17/18 > 2/3. In this example, driving the seller’s ex ante payoﬀ down to E[(v(0) − c(t))+] is only possible in
some equilibrium for high enough values of the buyer’s payoﬀ.
25under full commitment is such that no seller’s type trades with interior probability. If some
seller’s types do trade with interior probability, suﬃcient conditions can be given in terms of the
buyer’s gain function Y (see (7)). Because Y (0) = 0 and Y ′(0) > 0, yet Y (1) < 0, Y admits a
smallest local maximizer t. Note that t solves v(t) − c(t) = tc′(t) (assuming diﬀerentiability at
this point for the sake of this discussion). Let also ¯ t denote the smallest strictly positive root of
Y . We show in appendix C that eﬃciency is attainable in bargaining if
∀t ≥ ¯ t,
  t
t
(v(s) − c(t))ds ≥ 0. (9)
This condition is satisﬁed in the examples typically given in the literature (for instance, Samuel-
son’s two-step example), but obviously, as our example above shows (left panel), it is not always
true that eﬃciency can be achieved. Note that the condition becomes easier to satisfy as gains
from trade (v(t) − c(t)) increase, and information rents (tc′(t)) decrease (both t and ¯ t then
increase). We summarize this discussion as follows.
Constrained eﬃciency can be achieved by bargaining as δ → 1 (even when the ﬁrst-
best outcome cannot) if gains from trade are high, or information rents low enough.
Because bargaining can achieve the same degree of eﬃciency as any (incentive compatible,
individually rational) mechanism that satisﬁes veto-incentive compatibility, this implies that
market institutions may only improve upon bargaining if they constrain the buyer somehow, in a
way that weakens the veto-incentive compatibility constraint. This seems rather demanding, but
not impossible. For instance, screening contracts by the uninformed party (here, the buyer), as in
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), dispense with the requirement of veto-incentive compatibility: the
uninformed party oﬀers (and commits) to a menu of price and quantity pairs, and the informed
party chooses from them. This is not quite as demanding in terms of commitment as full
26commitment, although the diﬀerence is small (see Mylovanov, 2008). In any event, there is little
to gain from less constraining trading institutions. Note, for instance, that communication will
not expand the set of equilibrium outcomes. (Formally, the set of allocations that are achieved
by communication equilibria is the same as those achieved by perfect Bayesian equilibria in the
bargaining game, as δ → 1). Fortunately, as discussed, circumstances in which veto-incentive
compatibility does not reduce eﬃciency are quite common, and in those circumstances, as little
commitment as bargaining suﬃces.
How do equilibrium outcomes in bargaining compare with the unique equilibrium outcome
derived by Deneckere and Liang, when the buyer makes all the oﬀers? In our two examples, the
seller does worse in the latter equilibrium outcome than in any equilibrium outcome of our game.
However, it is easy to construct examples in which this is not the case. In fact, the following can
be shown (details available upon request).
Lemma 1
i. The allocation from the unique limit equilibrium outcome of the game in which the buyer
makes all the oﬀers is an equilibrium allocation in the game in which the seller makes all the
oﬀers if and only if it gives the lowest seller’s type his reservation payoﬀ (i.e., v(0)−c(0)),
provided that the discount factor is suﬃciently close to one.
ii. For δ close enough to one, the game in which the seller makes all the oﬀers admits an
equilibrium outcome that is strictly more eﬃcient than the limit equilibrium outcome of the
game in which the buyer makes all the oﬀers.
The ﬁrst statement should come as no surprise given that the allocation that results from the
bargaining game in which the buyer makes all the oﬀers must be veto-incentive compatible.
This follows from the “skimming” property in bargaining: because, from any history onward,
27the remaining seller’s types are all types above some threshold zn, and because the buyer’s
continuation payoﬀ must be non-negative, it must be that B(zn) ≥ 0.13
The second statement is immediately implied by the ﬁrst, given that the buyer secures a
strictly positive payoﬀ when he makes the oﬀers, yet within the set of veto-incentive compatible
allocations, eﬃciency is maximized when the buyer gets zero proﬁts.
Of course, this lemma compares the best equilibrium outcome in one game with the unique
equilibrium outcome in the other. There might be equilibria in the game in which the seller
makes all the oﬀers that are more ineﬃcient that the equilibrium outcome when the buyer makes
oﬀers. Rather surprisingly, our example illustrates that this need not be true, however. As is
obvious from the right panel of Figure 1, eﬃciency might be necessarily higher when the seller
makes all the oﬀers. This makes apparent that having the seller make all the oﬀers does not
simply “expand” the set of equilibria.
4 Main Proofs
4.1 Proof of Proposition 1 and Le 2
The proof of Theorem 2 will be divided in several steps. First, we establish Proposition 1,
which immediately implies Theorem 2.2, given Theorem 1. We will then show how this, along
with some other observations, can be used to establish Theorem 2.1.
The proof of Proposition 1 is itself divided into three parts. First, we show that, given an
allocation (x,p), the condition that B(t) be non-negative for all t is necessary for the allocation
to be implementable in the veto-incentive compatible program. Second, we turn to suﬃciency.
13If zn and zn+1 denote consecutive threshold types, the inequality B(t) ≥ 0 for t ∈ (zn,zn+1) follows from the
fact that the types in [zn,t] are the most unproﬁtable ones (for the buyer) above zn.
28We ﬁrst show that the conditions are suﬃcient if the functions c and v are step functions. Then
we show how, by appropriate limiting arguments, the result follows for any functions c and v
satisfying the assumptions of the model.
4.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
As mentioned, the argument is divided into three steps. First comes necessity.
Lemma 2 If (x,p) is an allocation that is implementable in the veto-incentive compatible pro-




(x(s)(v(s) − p(s))ds ≥ 0.
Proof. Fix an allocation (x,p) that is implementable in the veto-incentive compatible pro-

































The ﬁrst equality follows from the deﬁnition of the function p (see (2)). The ﬁrst inequality is
implied by veto-incentive compatibility; the second follows from the monotonicity of v; the last
equality, from the law of iterated expectations. This establishes the claim.
We now show suﬃciency in the special case in which c and v are step functions.
29Lemma 3 If c and v are step functions, and (x,p) is an allocation that is implementable in the




(x(s)(v(s) − p(s))ds ≥ 0,
then (x,p) is also implementable in the veto-incentive compatible program.
Proof. Since c and v are step functions, we may equivalently describe the environment as
ﬁnite: there are N types, with cost and values
c1 ≤ c2 ≤     ≤ cN, and v1 ≤ v2 ≤     ≤ vN.
To avoid some trivial but distracting complications, we shall assume that the inequalities in-
volving costs are strict: ∀i < n, ci < ci+1. The probability of each type (i.e., the length of
each step) is denoted qi.14 An allocation, then, reduces to a pair of vectors x = (x1,...,xN),
p = (p1,...,pN).







We shall show that any incentive-compatible, individually rational allocation satisfying this con-
dition can be implemented in the veto-incentive compatible program, using N prices. The proof
is by induction on the number of types (uniformly over all cost, values and probabilities).
14More precisely, the number of types N is the number of types ti ∈ T for which either c or v (or both) has a
discontinuity. The length of the interval refers to the intervals deﬁned by the corresponding partition of T.
30Note that this is true for N = 1. In that case, the buyer’s individual rationality constraint
implies p1 ≤ v1 (which trivially implies our hypothesis), while the seller’s individual rationality
constraint implies p1 ≥ c1. Note then that any such allocation (x1,p1) with p1 ∈ [c1,v1] satisﬁes
the veto-incentive compatibility constraint: conditional on p1, the buyer assigns probability one
to the (unique) type 1, and since v1 ≥ p1, his payoﬀ conditional on this event is positive.
Assume then that, whenever there are N types, and for any collection of costs, values and
probabilities {(c1,v1,q1),...,(cN,vN,qN)} (with 0 ≤ ci < vi, here and in what follows), any
incentive compatible, individually rational allocation {(x1,p1),...,(xN,pN)} that satisﬁes (10)
can be implemented in the veto-incentive compatible program with N (not necessarily distinct)
prices. Consider the case of N + 1 types, with cost, values and probabilities {ci,vi,qi}
N+1
i=1 . Fix
some incentive compatible, individually rational allocation
{(x1,p1),...,(xN+1,pN+1)},
satisfying (10). The argument is divided into three steps.
Step 1. Note that, by (10) with J = N + 1, pN+1 ≤ vN+1. Also, incentive compatibility
implies that pN ≤ pN+1. 15 It follows that there exists z ∈ [0,xN+1/xN] such that
zxNpN + (xN+1 − zxN)vN+1 = xN+1pN+1. (11)
To see this, note that, for z = 0, the left-hand side reduces to xN+1vN+1, which is at least as
large as the right-hand side, while for z = xN+1/xN, the left-hand side reduces to xN+1pN, which
is at most as large as the right-hand side. Fix some z satisfying (15). Note that z ≤ 1, because
15The argument is standard: considering the two incentive compatibility conditions involving types N and
N + 1 only, it follows that xN ≥ xN+1 and pN ≤ pN+1.
31xN ≥ xN+1.
Step 2. Consider the game in which there are N types, with costs and values {ˆ ci,ˆ vi, ˆ qi}N
i=1,
deﬁned as follows. Costs are unchanged: ˆ ci := ci, all i = 1,...,N. Values are given by




(note that ˆ vN ≥ vN ≥ ˆ cN), while probabilities are
ˆ qi :=
qi  
i≤N qi + qN+1z
for i < N, and ˆ qN :=
qN + qN+1z
 
i≤N qi + qN+1z
.
We claim that the allocation {(xi,pi)}
N
i=1 (derived from {(xi,pi)}
N+1
i=1 ) is implementable, in this
new environment, in the veto-incentive compatible program.
First, because costs are the same in this environment as in the original environment, individual
rationality and incentive compatibility for all seller’s types is implied by the fact that these were
satisﬁed by the allocation {(xi,pi)}
N+1
i=1 in the original environment.
Therefore, to show that this allocation is implementable in the veto-incentive compatible
program, given the induction hypothesis, it suﬃces to show that, for all J ≤ N,
N  
i=J




(Note that individual rationality for the buyer is the special case J = 1.) Simplifying,
N  
i=J





i=J xiqi (vi − pi) + qNxN (vN − pN) + qN+1xNz (vN+1 − pN)
 
.
32Adding and subtracting (xN+1 − xNz)vN+1 to the expression inside the square brackets yield
N  
i=J







i=J xiqi (vi − pi) + qNxN (vN − pN)+




Using the deﬁnition of z, we ﬁnally obtain
N  
i=J






xiqi (vi − pi)
 
≥ 0,
where the last inequality uses that, by assumption, the allocation satisﬁes (10).
Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, the allocation {(xi,pi)}
N
i=1 is implementable in the
veto-incentive compatible program, in this new environment, with N prices. Let {ˆ r1,..., ˆ rN}
be the prices that implement this allocation in the veto-incentive compatible program, and
{ˆ x1 (r),..., ˆ xN (r)}r∈{ˆ r1,...,ˆ rN} be the probabilities assigned to these prices.
Step 3. We now construct a set of prices {r1,...,rN+1} and probabilities {x1 (r),...,xN+1 (r)},
r ∈ {r1,...,rN+1}, that implement {(x1,p1),...,(xN+1,pN+1)} in the veto-incentive compatible
program, in the original environment.
The prices are given by
{r1,...,rN+1} = {ˆ r1,..., ˆ rN} ∪ {vN+1}.
The probabilities are given by, for i < N + 1,
xi (r) = ˆ xi (r),∀r ∈ {ˆ r1,..., ˆ rN}, and xi (vN+1) = 0,
33and
xN+1 (r) = zˆ xN (r)∀r ∈ {ˆ r1,..., ˆ rN}, and xN+1 (vN+1) = xN+1 − zxN.
It is immediate to see that, conditional on any given r ∈ {ˆ r1,..., ˆ rN}, the conditional value is the
same as in the modiﬁed environment, so that the buyer’s veto-incentive compatibility constraint
holds. This is also true if r = vN+1, because the only seller’s type trading at this price is type
N +1. Furthermore, by construction, buyer i trades with probability xi and receives an average
price pi. This completes the proof.
Finally, we can show suﬃciency for arbitrary cost and value functions.
Lemma 4 If (x,p) is an individually rational and incentive compatible allocation such that, for




x(s)[v(s) − p(s)]ds ≥ 0,
then (x,p) is implementable in the veto-incentive compatible program.
Proof. Fix an allocation (x,p) that satisﬁes the assumptions of the lemma. Consider a




n = 1, maxi |tn
i − tn
i+1| < K/n for some
constant K independent of n, and such that D ⊆ Pn, where D is the set of discontinuities of
either v or c (without loss of generality, assume that n is large enough to include this ﬁnite set).
We now deﬁne a sequence of functions cn,vn : T → R+ as follows: for all t < 1, set cn(t) :=
c(tn






, cn(1) := c(tn
n−1), as well as, for all t < 1, vn(t) := v(tn









Further, deﬁne the sequence of allocations xn,pn as follows: for all t ∈ T, set xn(t) := x(tn
j),
and pn(t) := p(tn












if j = n − 1.)16
16Note that the functions vn,cn as well as the allocations xn,pn are right-continuous.
34Note that the allocation (xn,pn) is incentive compatible and individually rational for the
seller given the functions (cn,vn) (because the choices of the types in the set Pn are incentive












j+1) ≤ x(t) ≤ x(tn
j) and p(tn
j+1) ≤ p(t) ≤ p(tn
j) (by incentive compatibility) for
t ∈ [tn
j,tn
j +1), j < i−1, we can pick these sequences such that, because B(tn
j) ≥ 0 (the lemma’s
hypothesis), it is also the case that also Bn
j ≥ 0 for all j (clearly, Bn
n = 0). Therefore, the
allocation (xn,pn) is individually rational for the buyer given (cn,vn) and further, given Lemma
4, this allocation is veto-incentive compatible in the game with cost and value functions (cn,vn).
Let µn denote the corresponding mechanism. The mechanism µn deﬁnes a function xn specifying
the probability of trade given some message t, and a joint distribution ˜ µ
n on T × R+ in case
that there is a trade for each type.17 Let ˆ µ
n denote the product distribution whose marginals
coincide with those of ˜ µn. Note that incentive compatibility and veto-incentive compatibility are
restrictions on the marginal distributions only, so that any mechanism inducing the pair xn and
ˆ µ
n also implements (xn,pn). Note that, by construction, (xn,pn) converge (pointwise) to (x,p),
and similarly, (cn,vn) converge pointwise to (c,v). Also, since we can replace the set of prices
R+ by the compact interval [0,v(1)] (because v(1) is an upper bound on the price that can be in
the support of any mechanism that is veto-incentive compatible), a subsequence of the sequence
{ˆ µ
n} (without loss of generality the sequence itself) must converge weakly to some distribution
ˆ µ. It follows from Theorem 3.2. of Billinsgley (1968) that ˆ µ must itself be a product distribution,
and that the marginals of ˆ µ
n converge weakly to the marginals of ˆ µ. Therefore, for all prices p,
17More precisely, x = µ( )[1,R+], as deﬁned in Section 2, and the distribution ˜ µ is the joint distribution
ν((1, ), ), where ν is the conditional distribution deﬁned in Section 2 as well.
35the marginal distribution ˆ µ
n( |p) converges weakly to ˆ µ( |p), and so it follows that, for all p,
 
T
ˆ µ(t|p)(t − p)dt ≥ 0,
which is precisely the requirement of veto-incentive compatibility. Therefore, along with x, ˆ µ de-
ﬁnes a veto-incentive compatible mechanism. (Incentive compatibility and individual rationality
are satisﬁed by hypothesis, given the limiting allocation (x,p)).
Note that Lemma 2 and 4 immediately imply Proposition 1.
4.1.2 Proof of Theorem 2.1
We shall now show that the payoﬀ set of the veto-incentive compatible program can be
obtained by assuming that:
1. the highest type of the seller that trades with positive probability has a zero payoﬀ;
2. all local incentive compatibility constraints are binding.
Let us refer to this payoﬀ set as ΠV. Note that this set is compact and convex. Both
claims will be established by considering the boundary of ΠV. Because both properties are
preserved under convex combinations, the result follows for the entire set. Also, given (x,p), let
¯ t := sup{t ∈ T : x(t) > 0}.
Clearly, (0,0) is an extreme point of this set, and because it is achieved by the allocation
(x,p) = (0,0), the claims are trivially valid for this point. We further divide this boundary into
ΠV
− := {(πS,πB) ∈ R2 : πB = max(π1,π2)∈ΠV π2 s.t. π1 ≤ πS} and ΠV
+ := {(πS,πB) ∈ R2 : πB =
max(π1,π2)∈ΠV π2 s.t. π1 ≥ πS}. As will be clear, ΠV
+ intersects the axis {(πS,0) : πS ∈ R}, so
that ΠV = co {(0,0)} ∪ ΠV
+ ∪ ΠV
−, where, given any set A, co A denotes the convex hull of A.
36Let us now establish three claims for ΠV
+∪ΠV




1. lims↓t πS(s|t) = πS(t) for all t. Suppose that this is not the case. First, consider the case
in which the payoﬀ is in ΠV






s | ˆ t
 
.
Clearly, ˆ t is a point of discontinuity of c(t) and x(t). Consider then the following alternative
allocation (x′,p′), deﬁned by
x′ (t) = x(t) + ε if t ∈ [ˆ t,ˆ t + ε), x′ (t) = x(t) otherwise;
¯ p′ (t) = ¯ p(t) + εc(t + ε)if t ∈ [ˆ t,ˆ t + ε), ¯ p′ (t) = ¯ p(t) otherwise.
It is straightforward to see that, for small enough ε > 0, this is incentive-compatible,
satisﬁes B (t) ≥ 0 for all t and strictly improves the buyer’s payoﬀ, while weakly improving
the seller’s payoﬀ. Consider next the case in which the payoﬀ of (x,p) belongs to ΠV
−. Take






s | ˆ t
 
. Clearly, ˆ t is a point of discontinuity
of c(t). Thus consider the alternative allocation (x′,p′), deﬁned by
x′ (t) = x(t) for all t ∈ [0,1],
¯ p′ (t) = ¯ p(t) − ε if t ∈ [0,ˆ t); ¯ p′ (t) = ¯ p(t) otherwise.
It is straightforward to check that for small ε > 0 this allocation is implementable. More-
over, it decreases the seller’s payoﬀ and increases the buyer’s payoﬀ, which contradicts the
assumption that the payoﬀ is in ΠV
−.
2. πS(¯ t) = 0, where ¯ t := sup{t ≤ 1 : x(t) > 0} is the highest seller’s type that trades
with positive probability. Again, consider ﬁrst the case in which the payoﬀ is in ΠV
+.
Modify the allocation by increasing p(t) (for all t such that x(t) > 0) by some (small)
37ε > 0, contradicting the hypothesis that π ∈ ΠV
+. Suppose next that π ∈ ΠV
−. Suppose
towards a contradiction that this is not the case. Fix some small η > 0 and let t∗ =
sup{t : x(t) − x(¯ t−) > η}. Since the allocation is right-continuous we must have x(t∗) ≤






















ˆ x(t) = x(¯ t) + η if t ∈ [t∗,¯ t), ˆ x(t) = x(t) otherwise;
ˆ p(t) = ˆ p if if t ∈ [t∗,¯ t), ˆ p(t) = p(t) otherwise.
The payoﬀ of each seller’s type weakly decreases in this alternative allocation, while the
payoﬀ of the buyer strictly increases. If the payoﬀ of the seller remains constant, we are
done. Suppose that the seller’s payoﬀ decreases by α > 0. There exists ε > 0 such that
  ¯ t
0 εdt = α. Thus, increase all prices by ε, so that the seller’s overall payoﬀ does not change.
This is incentive compatible and increases the buyer’s payoﬀ. Thus, since the increase in
surplus goes to the buyer, it is enough to show that B (t) ≥ 0, all t. Note that the variation
in the buyer’s ex ante payoﬀ is
∆B (0) =
  ¯ t
0
(∆x(t)(v(t) − c(t)))dt −
  ¯ t
0
(∆¯ p(t) − ∆x(t)c(t))dt
=
  ¯ t
0
(∆x(t)(v(t) − c(t)))dt > 0,
where ∆x(t) := x′ (t) − x(¯ t) and ∆¯ p(t) := ¯ p′ (t) − ¯ p(t). Furthermore,
∆x(t)(v(t) − c(t)) + (∆¯ p(t) − ∆x(t)c(t)) < 0,
if and only if t < t∗∗ ∈ [t∗,¯ t). Thus ∆B (t) ≥ 0 for all t, which completes the argument.
383. x(0) = 1. Suppose towards a contradiction that x(0) < 1. Since the cost function is piece-
wise right-continuous and piecewise diﬀerentiable we take an interval [0,η] such that the
allocation is diﬀerentiable on that interval. Fix n′ ∈ N such that 1/n′ < η, and consider
the following alternative allocation (xn, ¯ pn) deﬁned as
xn (t) = x(t) + (1 − x(0))if t ∈ [0, 1
n), xn (t) = x(t) otherwise;





(1 − x(0))if t ∈ [0,η), ¯ p(t) = ¯ p(t) otherwise.
Notice that there exists m > n′ such that this allocation is implementable (and is also a
Pareto improvement for all n > m). If π ∈ ΠV
+, this is an immediate contradiction. If
instead π ∈ ΠV
−, let k > 0 be the maximal subgradient of the payoﬀ set at π. Now notice
that for each n the payoﬀ of the buyer increases by (1 − x(0))
  1
n
0 (v (s) − c(1/n))ds, while
the payoﬀ of the seller increases by (1 − x(0))
  1
n
0 (c(s) − c(1/n))ds. Thus the ratio of the
increase in the payoﬀ of the buyer and the seller is arbitrarily large as n → ∞, and for n
large enough, both payoﬀs can be increased at a rate greater than k, a contradiction.
Note that we have now established Theorem 2, because the representation of the expected
payments ¯ p given there follows immediately from the ﬁrst two claims.
4.2 Proof of Theorem 3
This theorem is established by dividing the set of extreme points of the relevant payoﬀ set into
three diﬀerent cases, according to whether this extreme point lies to the “north-east,” “north-
west,” or “south-west” of the payoﬀ set (i.e., according to the signs of the weights on the seller’s
and buyer’s payoﬀ whose linear combination this extreme point maximizes.) Arguments for one
39case require minor modiﬁcations to be valid in the other cases.18 For brevity, we only provide
the complete proof for the case of positive weights, that is, we consider extreme points that lie
on the Pareto-frontier.
The proof is divided into two steps. First, it is shown that allocations for which x is a step
function satisfying some properties can be implemented as equilibria of the game. Second, we
show that every vertex of the equilibrium payoﬀ set is the limit of a sequence of such allocations.
We ﬁrst deﬁne a certain class of allocations (x,p).
4.2.1 Regular Allocations
Recall that, for all 0 ≤ t1 < t2 ≤ 1, v
t2
t1 = E[v(t)|t ∈ [t1,t2)].
Deﬁnition 1 The allocation (x,p) is regular if there exists 0 = t0 < t1 <     < tK ≤ 1, for some






xk if t ∈ [tk−1,tk), k = 1,...,K,
0 if t ≥ tK,






pk if t ∈ [tk−1,tk), k = 1,...,K,
0 if t ≥ tK,
with v(0) < p1 <     < pK;
18For instance, in the “south-west” region, the local incentive constraints are binding “downward,” and the
deﬁnition of regular allocations must be modiﬁed accordingly.
403. for each k = 1,...,K − 1,
xk (pk − c(tk,−)) = xk+1(pk+1 − c(tk,−)),
where tk,− = limt↑tk t (recall that c is right-continuous) and
xK (pK − c(tK,−)) ≥ 0;
4. We have





6. Finally, πS(0) ≥ v(0) − c(0).
That is, a regular allocation is a step allocation such that local incentive compatibility con-
straints hold at each jump, the contribution to the buyer’s payoﬀ of each interval of types [tk,1] is
zero except for k = 0,K−1, and positive for t = 0,K−1 (strictly so for t = K−1). Furthermore,
the expected valuation of the buyer over the penultimate interval of types exceeds the cost of
the seller’s highest type in the previous interval, and the seller’s lowest type must guarantee his
security payoﬀ.
A regular allocation need not be an equilibrium allocation in the discrete-time game, because
of the indivisibilities that discrete periods introduce. This indivisibility becomes less and less
41problematic as δ → 1, and we show that we can choose (xδ,pδ) such that
 (x
δ,p
δ)  →  (x,p) ,
uniformly in t, as δ → 1. The following lemma will be established in the next two subsections.
Lemma 5 Fix a regular allocation (x,p). There exists a sequence of equilibria σδ ∈ E(δ) such
that the corresponding sequence of allocations (xδ,pδ) converges to (x,p) as δ → 1, uniformly in
t ∈ T.
We ﬁrst turn to the deﬁnition of this allocation (xδ,pδ).
4.2.2 The Allocation (xδ,pδ)
Fix some regular allocation (x,p). In what follows, we assume that K > 2.19 Fix δ and
ε < min{p1 − v (0),v
tK−1
tK−2 − c(tK−1,−)}. Further, pick pδ
1,...,pδ
K−2, ˆ pδ, ˜ pδ ∈ R+ such that, for all
k = 1,...,K−2, ε/4 < pk−pδ
k < 3ε/4, as well as ε/4 < v
tK
tK−2−ˆ pδ < 3ε/4 and ε/4 < v
tK
tK−1−˜ pδ <
3ε/4. Set T δ
1 = 0, and consider the following system in T δ



























































































v(s) − ˜ p
δ 
ds. (12)
19The proof for K = 2 is very similar, but requires slightly diﬀerent notations.





δ has full rank (slightly change the values of
the pδ variables otherwise). By perturbing the values of the pδ variables, it thus follows from the
implicit function theorem that there exists δε < 1 such that for any δ > δε, the values of the pδ
variables can be chosen so that 0 < β
δ < 1, T δ
1,...,T δ





















K − xK|} ≤ ε.
Also, given equalities (13) and (14), the sequence β

























= xK (pK − c(tK,−)).
(13)
Because B (tK−2) = 0, B (tK−1) > 0 and v
tK−1
tK−2 > c(tK−1,−), β must lie in (0,1), and satisfy
xK−1
 











δ will play the role of a probability in our equilibrium construction.
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xδ(t) if t ∈ [tK−1,tK),
0 if t ≥ tK.
Note that for every k = 1,...,K − 2, we have
p
δ
k < pk ≤ v
tk
tk−1,
where the second inequality follows from the fact that B (0) ≥ 0, B (t1) =     = B (tK−2) = 0.




mented in the bargaining game when the discount factor is δ.
4.2.3 The equilibrium σδ of the bargaining game
First, we describe the players’ on-path behavior. Then we turn to the oﬀ-path behavior.
In the ﬁrst period of the game, the seller’s types in [t0,t1) make the oﬀer pδ
1 and the buyer
accepts it.
Consider now the types in the interval [tk−1,tk), k = 2,...,K−2. In period n = 1,...,T δ
k −1,
they make a losing oﬀer equal to v (1). In period T δ
k, the types in [tk−1,tk) make the oﬀer pδ
k and
the buyer accepts it.
Next, consider the types in [tK−2,tK−1)∪[tK−1,tK) = [tK−2,tK). In period n = 1,...,T δ
K−1−
1, they make the losing oﬀer v (1). In period T δ
K−1 the types in [tK−2,tK) oﬀer ˆ pδ. The buyer
accepts the oﬀer ˆ pδ with probability β
δ.
Suppose that the buyer rejects ˆ pδ. In the following period, period T δ
K−1 + 1, the types in
44[tK−2,tK−1) oﬀer v
tK−1
tK−2 and the buyer accepts the oﬀer. How about the types in [tK−1,tK)? In
period n = T δ
K−1+1,...,T δ
K −1, they make the losing oﬀer v(1). In period T δ
K they oﬀer ˜ pδ and
the buyer accepts the oﬀer.
Finally, each type t ≥ tK makes the losing oﬀer v(1) in every period.
To see that this behavior is part of an equilibrium, consider all possible deviations in turn.
Suppose that in a certain period n, a type t makes an oﬀer that the buyer is supposed to accept
with probability one. Suppose that the buyer deviates and rejects the oﬀer. Then the seller of
type t keeps making the same oﬀer until the buyer accepts it. On the other hand, the buyer
accepts the serious oﬀer in the ﬁrst period in which it is made.
If at any point the seller makes an oﬀer greater than v(0) and diﬀerent from the serious oﬀers
described above, the buyer rejects it. Of course, the buyer accepts any oﬀer smaller than v(0).
It is simple to verify that the strategy proﬁle just described constitutes an equilibrium (or
rather, that there exists a belief system along which this strategy proﬁle is an equilibrium). By
construction, each type t ∈ [tk−1,tk), k = 1,...,K − 1, is indiﬀerent between his own strategy
and the strategy of type t′ ∈ [tk,tk+1). Thus, any type t ∈ [0,1] does not any incentive to mimic
the equilibrium behavior of another type t′. Also, type t does not have any incentive to make
oﬀers that are not used in equilibrium since the buyer will reject them.
Conditional on receiving an oﬀer that has to be accepted with probability one, the buyer’s
expected payoﬀ is weakly positive. Thus, he has an incentive to accept the oﬀer.
Finally, consider the buyer in period T δ
K−1. If he rejects the oﬀer ˆ pδ, then in the following
period the types in [tK−2,tK−1) will oﬀer v
tK−1
tK−2. By deﬁnition, if the buyer accepts the oﬀer v
tK−1
tK−2,
his expected payoﬀ is equal to zero. This and equality (12) imply that in period T δ
K−1 the buyer
is indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting the oﬀer ˆ pδ.
The oﬀ-path behavior can be easily made sequentially rational by assuming that following
45any deviation the buyer assigns probability one to the event that the seller’s type is t = 0. (This
might be seen as an extreme belief revision, but it is convenient, and other possibilities would
do just as well.)
4.2.4 Proof of Theorem 3, Conclusion
The previous subsections have shown that any regular allocation can be achieved as an equi-
librium allocation in the bargaining game as δ → 1. Note that the set of equilibrium payoﬀs that
can be achieved in the bargaining game is a subset of the set of payoﬀs spanned by the allocations
described in Theorem 3, because the constraint πS(0) ≥ v(0)−c(0) must hold, as explained before
the theorem. Also, equilibrium allocations must satisfy veto-incentive compatibility. Therefore,
one direction of the Theorem 3 is obvious. The other direction will be established if we can
show that every extreme point of the set of veto-incentive compatible payoﬀs giving the seller
his security payoﬀ can be approximated arbitrarily closely by regular allocations. This is the
content of Lemma 6. Recall that, for brevity, we restrict ourselves here to the case of extreme
points of the payoﬀ set that lie on the Pareto-frontier.
Lemma 6 For every extreme point (πS,πB) (on the north-east boundary) of the payoﬀ set that
can be achieved by veto-incentive compatible allocations for which πS(0) ≥ v(0)−c(0), and every
ε > 0, there exists a regular allocation whose payoﬀ is within distance ε of (πS,πB).
Proof. See Appendix A.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 3.
465 Extensions
5.1 Non-monotonic Values
We have maintained throughout the assumption that both the seller’s cost, and the buyer’s
value are non-decreasing. Of course, there is no loss of generality in assuming that one of these
functions is non-decreasing. So let us assume that types are ordered so that only the cost function
is non-decreasing, and maintain all other assumptions (besides monotonicity). In particular, gains
from trade are bounded away from zero for all t, and, to avoid trivialities, the seller’s highest
cost exceeds the buyer’s average value. Does there exist a similarly tractable characterization of
the veto-incentive compatible program when the value function is not necessarily increasing? In
that case, it is easy to see that B(t) ≥ 0 for all t is no longer a necessary condition, although it
remains a suﬃcient condition for implementability. This suggests that positive correlation singles
out the collection of intervals {[t,1] : t < 1} as the relevant one for the domains of the integral
constraints B(t). We view it as an important next step to identify what the “right” collection
of intervals is, if any, over which the expected buyer’s payoﬀ must be positive, when values are
not positively correlated, before turning to more general environments with limited commitment
and private information.
In the absence of such a characterization, we might still ask the question: under which con-
ditions is the ex ante eﬃcient (i.e., surplus-maximizing) allocation of the commitment program
also implementable in the veto-incentive program, or even in the bargaining game as frictions
disappear? The answer to this question is surprisingly simple. Recall that the ex ante eﬃcient
mechanism under full commitment takes a very simple form, with (at most) two thresholds t1
and t2, with 0 < t1 ≤ t2 ≤ 1. If t1 = t2, it is trivial to implement the allocation in the game,
and, a fortiori, in the veto-incentive compatible program, so let us assume that t2 > t1. We have
47the following necessary and suﬃcient condition, which generalizes Proposition 1, at the cost of
being stated in terms of endogenous variables (t1,t2).
Proposition 2 If t2 > t1, the ex ante eﬃcient allocation of the commitment program is imple-







Proof. Suﬃciency follows closely the construction in 4.2.3 and is omitted. Necessity is
established in Appendix B.
In fact, the proof of necessity makes clear that it is equally necessary for veto-incentive
compatibility, so that this condition is also necessary and suﬃcient for implementability in the
veto-incentive compatible program.
5.2 Payoﬀs vs. Allocations
Our characterizations of veto-incentive compatibility, as well as limiting equilibrium outcomes
in the bargaining game, were cast in terms of the agents’ expected payoﬀs, not in terms of the
allocations themselves. This is no coincidence. Not every incentive-compatible allocation whose
payoﬀs satisfy the conditions of the characterization need be implementable. What we have
characterized is the projection of the implementable allocations onto the expected payoﬀs. We
have no direct characterization in terms of allocation only. For instance, not every allocation
that gives the seller’s lowest type a proﬁt πS(0) ≥ v(0) − c(0) need be implementable. Indeed,
suppose that there are three equiprobable types of seller (and buyer), and we consider parameters
such that the highest cost, c3, is strictly lower than the expected value of the lower two values,
(v1 + v2)/2. Further, consider an incentive compatible allocation in which the buyer’s expected
48payoﬀ is zero, the highest seller’s type does not trade, but the second highest does; this seller’s
intermediate type gets a strictly positive proﬁt, and the seller’s lowest type gets a payoﬀ exceeding
v(0) − c(0), so that, by our results, the resulting expected payoﬀs are equilibrium payoﬀs in the
bargaining game when frictions are suﬃciently small.20
Yet this speciﬁc allocation, which requires the seller’s high type not to trade, cannot be
implemented in the bargaining game. To see this, note that the buyer will never accept an oﬀer
that gives him a strictly negative payoﬀ, and therefore, because the buyer’s expected payoﬀ is
zero, it must be that his expected payoﬀ is also zero, conditional on any oﬀer that is submitted
with positive probability, after any history. By the martingale property of beliefs, there is a
sequence of equilibrium oﬀers along which the buyer’s expected value, conditional on these oﬀers,
is non-decreasing, and therefore, at least as large as (v1 + v2)/2 > c3. This sequence of oﬀers
must involve oﬀers accepted with positive probability, for otherwise the seller’s intermediate type
would not be willing to follow it. By mimicking this sequence of oﬀers, the seller’s highest type
guarantees a strictly positive proﬁt, a contradiction.
5.3 Limited Commitment on the Seller’s Side
Veto-incentive compatibility weakens the commitment assumption made in the full commit-
ment program on the buyer’s side. As discussed, this is a relaxation that is relevant for many
actual market institutions. Furthermore, our characterization of the equilibrium payoﬀs in the
bargaining game suggests that this is the “right” relaxation, namely, the absence of commitment
on either side, as captured by the bargaining game, appears to impose no further constraints on
20Such an example is easy to ﬁnd with a mathematical software: for instance, it occurs for the parameters
c1 = 1,c2 = 5970/2142,c3 = 175/51, and v1 = 134/65,v2 = 2458/509,v3 = 5. The allocation is x1 = 1,x2 =
1309475796/1359864155,x3 = 0,p1 = 926734382/271972831,p2 = 898659860/271972831,p3 = 0.
49achievable payoﬀs, aside from the security payoﬀ that the seller must secure.21
It is then natural to ask whether one could derive results that mirror those of Section 3.2 in
which the seller’s commitment, instead of, or in addition to, the buyer’s commitment is relaxed.
While we shall not attempt to obtain a characterization for each possible case, we discuss here
the relationship between the diﬀerent sets of allocations and payoﬀs. As we shall see, limited
commitment on the seller’s side is arguably less of a problem than on the buyer’s side.
Unlike the buyer, the seller gets an opportunity to inﬂuence the terms at which the trade
would take place. Therefore, there are two possible ways of modeling the absence of commitment
on the seller’s side. A mechanism is ex post individually rational for the seller if the price p that
is oﬀered to the buyer is always higher than the cost of the seller’s reported type t:




This guarantees that the seller never loses from the mechanism, but it does not give him the
authority to actually prevent the trade. Alternatively, we might endow the seller with the ability
to block the trade given the realized price. This notion, in line with Forges’ original deﬁnition of
veto-incentive compatibility, is more demanding than ex post individual rationality: the ability
to block the trade aﬀects the seller’s incentives to report his type truthfully, as the payoﬀ from
making a given report must include the option value from blocking the trade if the realized price
happens to be below the seller’s actual cost. To be more formal, we re-deﬁne the payoﬀ of the
21Of course, in bargaining, the seller is not formally allowed to withdraw an oﬀer that he makes, but why would
he? Acceptance by the buyer reveals no information, so a seller that anticipates withdrawing an oﬀer might as
well not submit it.






A mechanism is seller veto-incentive compatible if it is incentive compatible given the payoﬀ ˆ π,
and the allocation (x,p) is implementable in the seller’s veto-incentive compatible program if
there is a mechanism that is seller veto-incentive compatible and induces the allocation (x,p),
according to eqns. (1)–(2), taking into account that trade does not take place for prices below
c(t). To distinguish this notion from veto-incentive compatibility as deﬁned in Section 2, the
latter will now be referred to as buyer veto-incentive compatibility.
Does seller veto-incentive compatibility, or even ex post individual rationality restrict the set
of implementable allocations, or the set of achievable payoﬀ vectors? In a nutshell, the answer
is no, as far as payoﬀs are concerned, and sometimes, as far as allocations are concerned, but
only if it comes in addition to buyer veto-incentive compatibility. More precisely, we have the
following proposition.
Proposition 3
i. The set of implementable allocations (and thus, of achievable payoﬀ vectors) in the full
commitment program remains unchanged if seller veto-incentive compatibility is imposed.
ii. The set of implementable allocations (and thus, of achievable payoﬀ vectors) in the buyer
veto-incentive compatible program remains unchanged if seller ex post individual rationality
is imposed.
iii. The set of achievable payoﬀ vectors in the buyer veto-incentive compatible program remains
unchanged if seller veto-incentive compatibility is imposed.
51Because seller veto-incentive compatibility implies seller ex post individual rationality, we have
omitted some relationships that follow from the proposition. For instance, from (i), it follows
that seller ex post individual rationality does not restrict the set of implementable allocations in
the full commitment program. Furthermore, all remaining inclusions are strict: that is, for some
parameters, the set of implementable allocations in the buyer veto-incentive compatible program
is strictly reduced if seller veto-incentive compatibility is imposed, and, as we know, the set of
implementable allocations in the veto-incentive compatible program is strictly contained in the
set of allocations of the full commitment program, for some parameters.
The proofs of the claims in Proposition 3, some of which follow arguments that are similar
to the other proofs in the paper, are sketched in Appendix D.22 Additional details, as well as
examples establishing the strict inequalities, are available from the authors.
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6 Omitted Proofs
Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 6
As mentioned, we restrict ourselves to the case of extreme points that lie on the Pareto-
frontier here. Considering points on the “north-west” and “south-west” of the relevant payoﬀ
set require relatively straightforward modiﬁcations.
We proceed with a series of claims.
Claim 5 Consider an interval I = [t1,t2) such that B (t) = 0 for all t ∈ I and (c,v) are C1 on
I. Assume that (x(t2),p(t2)) = (x2,p2) ≫ 0 and x(t) satisﬁes the following diﬀerential equation
54on I:
−x(t)v
′ (t) = x
′ (t)(v(t) − c(t)).




n (t2,−) − c(t2,−)) = ¯ p(t2) − x(t2)c(t2,−).










,t2). For each I, we write
v(I) := E[v (t) | t ∈ I].
Next, we deﬁne the regular allocation for each n. In this allocation, xn (t) is constant over each
of interval In
i . Thus, we deﬁne {xn
1,...,xn
n} such that xn (t) := xn
i if t ∈ In







1) − c(t2,−)) = ¯ p(t2) − x(t2)c(t2,−),
and, recursively, xn














































































































































































































































v(tn (s)) − c(tn (s))
 
ds + Rn,























































    = 0.
56This establishes uniform convergence of logxn (z). Because xn (t) ≥ x(t2) for every t and for
every n this establishes convergence of xn.
Claim 6 Consider an implementable allocation (x,p) with support [0,¯ t]. There are two countable






























2) : B (t) = 0 if t ∈ Bi
 
,
such that µ(∪iAi) + µ(∪iBi) = ¯ t, where µ is the Lebesgue measure.
Proof. Because B is continuous, the set {t ∈ [0,1] : B (t) > 0} is open. This establishes i).
Notice that A is a countable collection of sets. Therefore, µ(∪iAi) = µ(∪icl Ai), where cl F
denotes the closure of set F. Therefore, the set [0,¯ t]/∪icl Ai is open and has measure ¯ t−µ(∪iAi).
This establishes ii).
























[¯ p(s) − x(s)c(s)] > 0.
Then there exists ε∗ > 0 and K > 0 such that if ε ≤ ε∗ and if max{dv(Ij),dc(Ij)} ≤ ε
57then dx(Ij) ≤ Kε∗ for every j < J, where
dg (Ij) :=
 













Proof. Let λ := mint [v(t) − c(t)] > 0. Thus inft∈Ij v(t) − supt∈Ij c(t) ≥ λ







x(tj,−)(p(tj,−) − c(tj,−)) ≥ x(tj−1)(p(tj−1) − c(tj,−)). (16)
We have
x(tj,−)(p(tj,−) − c(tj,−)) ≤ x(tj,−)(v (tj−1) − c(tj−)) + x(tj,−)ε, (17)
and
x(tj−1)(p(tj−1) − c(tj,−)) ≥ x(tj−1)(v (tj−1) − c(tj,−)) − εx(tj−1). (18)
Thus
x(tj,−)(v (tj−1) − c(tj,−)) + x(tj,−)ε ≥ x(tj−1)(v(tj−1) − c(tj,−)) − εx(tj−1), (19)
which implies































Corollary 8 If {Ij}
n
j=1 is a sequence of sets satisfying the assumptions of the Claim above such
that
 
j max{dv(Ij),dc(Ij)} ≤ ε then
 
j dx(Ij) ≤ Kε.
We may ﬁnally prove the following strengthening of Lemma 6.
Lemma 7 For every extreme point (πS,πB) of the payoﬀ set that can be achieved by veto-
incentive compatible allocations for which πS(0) ≥ v(0) − c(0), and every ε > 0, there exists
a regular allocation (xn,pn) such that  (x,p) − (xn,pn)  < ε.





Our goal is to construct a sequence of regular allocations (x∗
n,p∗
n) arbitrarily close to (x,p) such
that limn (x∗
n,p∗




- Step 1: For every n ∈ N, we set (xn (t),pn (t)) := (x(t),p(t)) if t > t2.













containing 3 classes of intervals:
i) Type A intervals An: intervals such that B (t) > 0 for every t ∈ int In
j and B (t) = 0 if
t ∈ cl In
j ;
ii) Type B intervals Bn: intervals such that B (t) = 0 for every t ∈ int In
j ;
































23The alternative case requires minor adjustments in the argument.
59Without loss we take An,Bn and Cn such that all discontinuity points belong to the bound-
ary of these sets.





p(t) if t ∈ In
j and In








logxn (t−) + log(pn (t−) − c(t−)) = logxn (t) + log(pn (t) − c(t−)). (21)





and t′ = tn
j,2. Assume that tn





















































































































































































   
+












Thus, for every t, we have
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Thus, for every t, we have























































   
.
Furthermore, since there exists γ > 0 and n′ ∈ N such that if n > n′ and t < t2, we have
log(pn (s) − c(s)) ≥ γ and log(p(s) − c(s)) ≥ γ for all s < t2 and n > n′ then (iv) implies
that logxn (t) → logx(t) uniformly.
- Step 4: Consider n ∈ N such that  (xn,pn) − (x,p)  <
ε
2.
Now consider the allocation (xn,pn). We will construct a regular allocation (x∗
m,p∗
m) such
that  (xn,pn) − (x∗
m,p∗
m)  < ε
2. We consider the class Bn (remember that n is kept ﬁxed).











m)  = 0.






. This partition consists of all intervals In
j ∈ An∪Cn
and of a mesh of the intervals In
j ∈ Bn into m subintervals of the same length. This
generates a class of intervals Bm such that if t ∈ Im
j ,Im
j ∈ Bm, then B (t) = 0 for all
t ∈ int Im

















We use (21) to deﬁne x∗
m (t). Next, it follows from Claim 5 that for every ϑ > 0, there
exists m′ ∈ N such that if m > m′ then for each interval In










  < ϑ, (25)
where ξ
n




































m (t)v′ (t) = ξ
j
m (t)
′ (v (t) − c(t)) for every t ∈ int In
j . This allow us to conclude








  converge uniformly to zero. Assume that
there are J1 of these terms.












j for some In
j ∈
Bn. Notice that the number of these intervals is the same for each m. Furthermore, by
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converges to zero.
Thus, take η > 0. Consider m∗ such that if m > m∗ then for every In













































for all of the terms identiﬁed in the paragraph above. Thus, we conclude that for every
t ∈ [0,1] |logx∗
m (t) − logxn (t)| < η. Since pm (t) → pn (t) pointwise, by dominated con-
vergence we conclude that limm  (xn,pn) − (x∗
m,p∗




m (0) to guarantee that x∗
m (t) ∈ [0,1] for every t. This concludes the proof.
63Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2




    
    
(1 − x)c(t1) + xc(t2) t ∈ [0,t1),
xc(t2) t ∈ [t1,t2],
0 t > t2.
Deﬁne the set ˆ T as
ˆ T := {t ∈ [0,t2] : v(t
′) ≤ v(t) for every t
′ ∈ [0,t2]}.
Throughout we assume that the set ˆ T is nonempty (this is not guaranteed by our assumptions,
and minor adjustments are necessary otherwise). To ease notation, we let ˆ v denote the value of
the function v over the set ˆ T.
Suppose that c(t2) > v
t2
t1. We want to show that it is impossible to construct a collection of
distributions (µ( |t))t∈[0,t2] over the interval [0,ˆ v] which satisfy the following three conditions:
i) for every t ∈ [0,t2],
  ˆ v
0
dµ(p|t) = x(t), (26)
ii) for every t ∈ [0,t2],
  ˆ v
0
pdµ(p|t) = ¯ p(t), (27)
iii) for all p ∈ [0, ˆ v],
  t2
0
(v(t) − p)dµ(p|t) = 0.
(Recall that under the ex ante eﬃcient mechanism the buyer’s expected payoﬀ is equal to zero).
We approximate the function v by a sequence of step functions vn, n ∈ N. In particular, each
64vn satisﬁes
i) for every t ∈ [0,t2],
v (t) ≤ v
n (t) ≤ ˆ v,
ii) for every t ∈ [0,1],
0 ≤ v




iii) if t and t′ belong to the same step of vn, then x(t) = x(t′).
Finally, for each n ∈ N, we let In ⊂ [0,t2] denote the union of the intervals over which the
function vn takes the value ˆ v.




n (t) − p)dµ(p|t) = ε
n (p),








ˆ v − vn (t)




ˆ v − p
≥ 0.














ˆ v − vn (t)
ˆ v − p
 
dµ(p|t)dt ≥ 0.
For each t ∈ [0,t2]\In, let ¯ µ( |t) denote the distribution that assigns probability x(t) to the oﬀer
¯ p(t)/x(t) (with probability 1 − x(t) no oﬀer is made). Notice that the function 1
p−ˆ v is concave














ˆ v − vn (t)
ˆ v − p
 
d¯ µ(p|t)dt ≥ tz
n ≥ 0. (28)
We take the limit of ¯ zn as n goes to inﬁnity, so that
¯ z := limn→∞ ¯ zn = t1 + (t2 − t1)x −
R t1
0 (ˆ v−v(t))dt

















ˆ v−(1−x)c(t1)−xc(t2) = 0,
where the inequality follows from the fact that c(t2) > v
t2
t1, and the last equality follows from the
deﬁnition of x in equation (6). However, ¯ z being strictly negative contradicts the fact that it is
the limit of a sequence of nonnegative numbers (see condition (28)).
Appendix C: A Suﬃcient Condition for the Eﬃcient Mechanism to be
Implemented in the Bargaining Game




(v(s) − c(t))ds =
  t
0
(v(s) − c(s) − sc
′ (s))ds.
Our assumptions imply that, as mentioned, Y (0) = 0, Y ′ (0) > 0 and Y (1) < 0. Let t denote
the smallest local maximizer of the function Y . Also, let ¯ t denote the smallest strictly positive
root of Y . For any t let µ(t) denote the mechanism under which the types below t trade with
probability one at the price c(t) and the types above t do not trade. Notice that if Y (t) ≥ 0,
then the mechanism µ(t) is incentive compatible and individually rational.
Consider the eﬃcient mechanism under full commitment. We know that there exist 0 < t1 ≤
66t2 ≤ 1 such that the seller’s types in [0,t1) trade with probability 1, while the types in [t1,t2]
trade with probability x(t1,t2) ∈ [0,1) (all other types of the seller do not trade). Recall that
the buyer’s individual rationality constraint holds with equality. Thus, we have
0 =
  t1




t1 v(s)ds − t2c(t2)
 
=
Y (t1) + x
  t2
t1 (v(s) − c(s) − sc′ (s))ds = Y (t1) + x(Y (t2) − Y (t1)).
Therefore, we can express x(t1,t2) as
x(t1,t2) =
Y (t1)
Y (t1) − Y (t2)
.
Consider the case in which t2 > t1, i.e., there is a set of types who trade with a probability
larger than zero but smaller than one. First, we must have Y (t2) − Y (t1) < 0, otherwise we
may increase x and improve eﬃciency. This immediately implies Y (t1) > 0. Second, under the
optimal mechanism Y (t2) < 0. In fact, if Y (t2) ≥ 0, it is possible to implement the mechanism
µ(t2), which is more eﬃcient than the original one. In particular, this implies that t2 > ¯ t.
Finally, we must have t1 ≥ t. Suppose that t1 < t. Fix t2 of the original mechanism and
choose t′
1 ∈ (t1,t]. Consider the mechanism under which the types in [0,t′
1) trade with probability
1 while the types in [t′







1) − Y (t2)
>
Y (t1)
Y (t1) − Y (t2)
= x(t1,t2),
where the inequality follows from Y (t′
1) > Y (t1) and Y (t2) < 0. Of course, the new mechanism is
more eﬃcient than the original one since the types in [t1,t2] trade with a larger probability while
the types outside this interval trade with the same probability as under the original mechanism.
We summarize our results:
67Fact 9 Let t1 and t2 denote the endpoints of the ﬁrst two steps of the optimal mechanism. Then
t1 ≥ t, and t2 ≥ ¯ t.
We are now ready to provide a suﬃcient condition to implement the eﬃcient mechanism in
the bargaining game (when the players are suﬃciently patient).
Condition 10 For any t ≥ ¯ t
  t
t
(v(s) − c(t))ds ≥ 0.





→ R given by
ϕ(t) :=






























). The function ϕ is increasing [0,t′′]. By deﬁnition, ϕ is positive above t′′.
Therefore, ﬁx t2 ≥ ¯ t. Our condition guarantees that for each t1 ∈ [t,t2],
  t2
t1
(v (s) − c(t2))ds ≥ 0,
which implies the result, by Proposition 1.
Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 3 (Sketch)
This appendix sketches the proofs of the two harder statements in Proposition 3. We ﬁrst
show that the set of allocations in the buyer veto-incentive compatible program is the same
68whether or not one imposes ex post seller individual rationality. We then show that, as far as
payments are concerned, the latter requirement can even be strengthened to seller veto-incentive
compatibility. In both cases, for simplicity, we restrict attention to ﬁnite types. The extension
to our set-up with a continuum of types follows by standard limiting arguments.
Lemma 8 Assume that c and v are step functions with n steps such that c1 < c2 <     < cN,
and (x,p) is an allocation that is implementable in the veto-incentive compatible program. Then




Proof. Since (c,v) are step functions we can consider the model with N types in which the
probability of each type is qi. We write {µi}
N
i=1 for the distribution of oﬀers faced by type i.
Step 1: We divide the type space into 3 subsets:
T1 := {i ∈ {1,...,N} : pi > vi},
T2 := {i ∈ {1,...,N} : pi < vi},
T3 := {i ∈ {1,...,N} : pi = vi}.






qi (xi (vi − pi)).
Step 3: Notice that LN
0 = B (0) ≥ 0, and let J∗ be the lowest type i such that Li
0 ≥ 0.
Here we show how to construct an allocation satisfying the properties above for the special case
that J∗ = N > 1. The general proof considers a partition of the type space {1,...,i1},{i1 +
1,...,i2},...,{iK + 1,...,N} and applies this procedure to each set separately.
69Step 4: We will present an algorithm which delivers the desired result.
Step 4.1: Let k1 be the smallest element in T2.
There are 2 cases to consider:
Case 1:
q1x1 (v1 − p1) + qk1xk1 (vk1 − pk1) < 0.
Case 2:
q1x1 (v1 − p1) + qk1xk1 (vk1 − pk1) ≥ 0.
Case 1: Notice that since k1 > 1, we have pk1 ≥ p1. From type k1’s individual rationality
constraint, we have pk1 ≥ ck1. Also, there exists λ ∈ (0,1) such that
λq1x1 (v1 − p1) + qk1xk1 (vk1 − pk1) = 0. (29)
Next, notice that
p1 = αpk1 + (1 − α)v1, (30)
for some α ∈ (0,1]. Thus, applying (30) into (29) we have
0 = λq1x1 (1 − α)(v1 − v1) + λq1x1α(v1 − pk‘) + qk1xk1 (vk1 − pk1). (31)





    
    
λx1 if i = 1,
xk1 if i = k1,
0 otherwise,











i > 0 then µ1
i[0,ci) = 0.
For that, we deﬁne µ1
i := 0 if i / ∈ {1,k1} and
µ1
1 (˜ p) :=

    
    
λx1α if ˜ p = pk1
λx1 (1 − α) if ˜ p = v1
0 otherwise
µ1




xk1 if ˜ p = pk1,
0 otherwise.
Case 2: There exists (ζ,γ) ∈ (0,1] × (0,1] such that
p1 = ζpk1 + (1 − ζ)v1,






    
    
x1 if i = 1,
γxk1 if i = k1,
0 otherwise,
and ˆ x1 := x−x1 ≥ 0. For the allocation (x1,p), we construct measures {µ1
i}
N
i=1 by setting µ1
i := 0
if i / ∈ {1,k1} and
µ1
1 (˜ p) :=

    
    
x1ζ if ˜ p = pk1
x1 (1 − ζ) if p = v1
0 otherwise
µ1




γxk1if ˜ p = pk1,
0 otherwise.
71Step 4.2: Assume that x =
 M
i=1 xi + ˆ xM. There are two possibilities:
Case i.
 
i ∈ {1,...,N} : ˆ xM
i > 0
 
∩ T1  = ∅.
Case ii.
 
i ∈ {1,...,N} : ˆ xM
i > 0
 
⊆ T2 ∪ T3.
Assume that ˆ x
M−1














i (vi − pi)
 
< 0
if J < N. We claim:
Claim 11 If Step 4.1 is applied to ˆ x
M−1
i , ˆ x
M−1
i = xM
i + ˆ xM
i with
 
















i (vi − pi)
 
< 0 if J < N.













i (vi − pi)
 
. For
the second, let kM−1 be the largest element of
 




∩ T2. There are two
possibilities:






































i (vi − pi)
 








1{i∈T1} (vi − pi) < 0.







































i (vi − pi)
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From Claim 11, we can apply Step 4.1 into ˆ xM
















i > 0 then µ
M+1
i [0,ci) = 0.
Notice that this procedure can take (at most) N − 1 rounds. In order to complete the Lemma
we move to Case ii.














i if ˜ p = pi
0 otherwise.
Step 5: Assume the algorithm described in Step 4.1 and Step 4.2 was applied to the
allocation x such that x =
K  
j=1
xj + ˆ xk. Thus it is straightforward to verify that the measure
{µi}
N











and µi[0,ci) = 0. This
completes the proof.
We now turn to the other nontrivial claim: seller veto-incentive compatibility does not restrict
the set of payoﬀs that can be achieved in the buyer veto-incentive compatible program. Here as
well, attention is restricted to ﬁnite types.
73Lemma 9 Assume that the type space is ﬁnite and let
 
πB,πS 
be a vertex of the payoﬀ frontier
achieved in the (buyer) veto-incentive compatible program. There exists a seller veto-incentive
compatible measure µ = {µi}
N
i=1 that achieves this payoﬀ.
Proof. Assume that there are N types.24 It can be shown that if
 
πB,πS 
is a vertex of the
payoﬀ frontier then it achieved by an allocation (x,p) for which there exists a partition of the
type space: {Pj}
K
j=1 with P1 = {1,...,i1} and Pj = {ij−1 + 1,...,ij}, with iK ≥ 1 such that:25
i. If j < K, then if i,i′ ∈ Pj we have pi = pi′ = E[v | Pj].
ii. If j = K, then we have either a. or b. below:
a. (pi,xi) = (pN,xN) for all i ∈ PK;
b. PK = I1 ∪ I2 where I1 = {ik−1 + 1,...,il} and I2 = {il + 1,...,N} with ik−1 ≤
il < N is such that (pi,xi) = (p′,x′) if i ∈ I1 and (pi,xi) = (p′′,x′′) if i ∈ I2 with
cil ≤ E[v | i ∈ I1] and p′ < p′′.
Here, we prove the more challenging case b.
Step 1: Deﬁning µi for i / ∈ PK by:




xi if ˜ p = pi,
0 otherwise.
Step 2: To deﬁne µi for i ∈ PK, there are two cases to consider:
Case 1: p′ ≤ E[v | i ∈ I1].
24For simplicity of exposition we assume that all types trade with positive probability.
25A proof is available upon request.
74In this case we let




x′ if ˜ p = p′ and i ∈ I1
0 if ˜ p  = p′ and i ∈ I1




x′′ if ˜ p = p′′ and i ∈ I2,
0 if ˜ p  = p′′ and i ∈ I2.
It is straightforward to check that µ is veto-incentive compatible for the seller.
Case 2: p′ > E[v | i ∈ I1].




qixi (vi − pi) ≥ 0, (32)
Furthermore, because p′ ∈ (E[v | i ∈ I1],p′′), there exists α ∈ (0,1) such that
p
′ = αE[v | i ∈ I1] + (1 − α)p
′′. (33)




qixi (vi − pi) +
 
i∈I2

















i∈I1 (1 − α)qixi (vi − p′′) +
 
i∈I2 qixi (vi − p′′) = Bik−1+1 ≥ 0.
75Therefore, we deﬁne µi by
µi (˜ p) :=

    
    
αx′ if ˜ p = E[v | i ∈ I1] and i ∈ I1
(1 − α)x′ if ˜ p = p′′ and i ∈ I1
0 if ˜ p / ∈ {p′,p′′} and i ∈ I1




x′′ if ˜ p = p′′ and i ∈ I2,
0 if ˜ p  = p′′ and i ∈ I2.
It is straightforward to verify that the allocation constructed is veto-incentive compatible for
the seller. This completes the proof.
76